

their spirit, their enthusiasm is the very contagion of enlistment. Second, fill up the old, do not recruit new regiments; a little leaven soon leavens the whole lump. Third, industrial conditions indicate classes and places where men suited for certain purposes should be found. Machine shops and factories furnish good artificers. Clerks, employes and laborers on great concerns working under an overseer yield ready obedience and are quickly available for duty after a short training under arms. Farmers make good cavalry and pioneers. These points were most clearly illustrated in the armies of the Confederacy, which generally had good cavalry and pioneers, indifferent infantry and wretched artillery.

Worthy also of remembrance as verified by experience are the following:

First—Other things being equal, men who have been in the habit of giving orders, directing and controlling others, as managers of large concerns, overseers and foremen, will be the most quickly available and in the end probably the best officers and non-commissioned officers. Slave holders were the best and quickest made commanders in the Southern armies.

Second—A large proportion of artillery is required for volunteer forces. The artillery preparation for their attack must be very thorough, as a check to their movement seems almost certain disaster.

Third—It is useless to provide and load on an extensive equipment. A volunteer will hardly carry his mess outfit; he will carry his trenching tool only after two or three pitched battles, and his clothing bag never.

In America the habit of civil life is pre-eminently independent. Every one follows if not his own inclination at least his own initiative, and liberty of thought, speech and action is perhaps more extensive more increasing and less interfered with than any other civilized country on earth. We cannot expect that men living under these conditions and suddenly brought as volunteers under military rule, should be submissive to discipline, and they are not. They are its hardest subjects. The lengths to which in the Civil war they carried resistance to it sometimes led into extreme and dangerous foolishness, sometimes into insubordination and bull-doing almost beyond the conception of one who never witnesses it. Company "Q" was an organization that silenced or drove out many an officer whose ideas of discipline passed beyond popularity and approached the needs of the hour. Let him who undertakes in the future to command volunteers expect similar experiences. Yet there is a saving principle. In America men volunteer for a definite purpose. They will do and bear whatever is necessary, but no more, to accomplish it. If they can be made to understand that discipline and obedience are so necessary, they may be counted upon to yield them, not full nor passive, but rational. On a commander's recognition and politic application of the principle hang his whole success with volunteers. In the past this understanding has been brought to our volunteer sometimes by his own enlightened intelligence, sometimes by instruction, sometimes by the convincing argument of some disaster manifestly due to lack of discipline. In every case, however, it has seemed the first step necessary to obtain real discipline. The next a severe but exact justice without mercy. The latter appears to have been the idea of the austere Jackson, probably the most successful disciplinarian and commander of volunteers that America has ever known. He prayed for their souls and then caused his deserters, mutineers and cowards to be shot.

To the volunteer, untaught in its demands, war is a business the entrance upon which requires no preparation, only willingness to fight. The labor of preparation, the waiting, the submission, the surrender of self-control necessary to drill, to instruct, to make a soldier, seem to him either so much needless military "fol-de-rol," or else the dallying and delay of superiors who foolishly fear to come to blows with a contemptible enemy. To overcome this feeling in the volunteers, to teach him that he cannot let go his pen or plow and be instantly ready and able to stand before any of the most trained soldiers on earth, to make him understand that military methods must differ from civil methods, that commanders must be arbitrary and autocratic and that all their decisions cannot be appealed to the supreme court of the United States, is a very difficult step in making the volunteer a soldier, requiring great tact, patience and knowledge of the American habits of thought and living. It is one, indeed, where have been witnessed, if not recorded in history, many stumbings, many falls, many full stops. Here at the beginning of the Civil war many regular officers, attempting to train volunteers

gave up the task in disgust and discouragement to return to the regulars. Nor can it be claimed that on submission alone the volunteer quickly becomes a good soldier. He does not. To make good soldiers from even the most ready, willing and adaptable material, takes time. The first Bull Run, fought July 21, 1861, showed both Federals and Confederates that their armies were but assemblages of raw, untrained and undisciplined men. The campaign ended immediately. Soldier-making was resumed and continued with great earnestness on both sides, yet neither felt his army prepared, nor dared, notwithstanding public impatience North and South, to resume hostilities for nine long months, till the opening of McClellan's Peninsular Campaign in April, 1862. Ten and fifteen years later two great European wars were fought to a finish, one in two months less, the other in two months more time than two able American commanders found necessary to prepare their raw volunteers for a first real campaign.

Having, however, been finally made to see his obligations as a soldier he may be relied upon to respond to them, to drop quibbles and do his whole duty. Of such instances history is full. I need mention but one, already referred to, the earnest work of organization, drill and discipline which followed the first Bull Run in the army of the Potomac.

Notwithstanding occasional indications of what may be called disloyalty to his own officers in his own camp, our volunteer is incorruptible by the enemy. Let it go down to his everlasting honor; history can record not one general instance of the contrary.

In aggressive campaign, with an end in view and the purpose of his leaders understood, the volunteer is at his best. The world can show no greater labors and fatigues more unhesitatingly undertaken, more zealously pressed or uncompainingly borne under heat and cold or in the deadly damp and miasms of forests and swamps. In preparation for an advance or attack, no man can do more manual labor or do it more willingly. General Pope's command, displaying the greatest eagerness, stood in mud and water up to the waist and cut a great steamer canal in the deep, wooded swamps of Mississippi. It caused the fall of Island No. 10. The labors, discomforts and sufferings of General Grant's men in the swamps opposite Vicksburg are too well known to need description. In 1863 General Sherman marched east from Vicksburg. In four days he had completely destroyed one hundred and ten miles of railroad, countless cars, seventeen engines and the town of Meridian—a large, probably unbeaten record. General Gillmore reduced Pulaski. To accomplish it he built in summer eleven batteries and put in place thirty-six heavy guns. Speaking of their labors, the Count of Paris says: "The site chosen for the batteries most distant from the landing was separated by two and one-half miles from the latter place. It became necessary not only to drag over this entire distance the gabions, the fascines, the timber for platforms, the gun carriages, the cannon and mortars which were to constitute the armament of the batteries but to construct beforehand a causeway for the conveyance of all this heavy material across the swamp, the ground of which had about the consistency and elasticity of gelatine. This preparatory labor consumed a vast quantity of stumps and trees and brushwood. After it was completed, the Federal soldiers had another task to perform which was equally difficult. Every night after having assisted in landing the material on a dangerous shore, up to their waists in water, they harnessed themselves to heavy carts loaded with a portion of the armament, dragged them through the deep sand and along a narrow causeway more than 1,600 yards long. At times one might see more than two hundred and fifty men striving with great difficulty to move one of these vehicles, sometimes lighted by the uncertain rays of the moon, which gave a false appearance of firmness to the smooth surface of the mud, sometimes bending under the gusts of wind which caused the sea to roar along the beach, lashing their faces with the salt foam."

If, however, our volunteer will do much, he also demands much. Americans are probably the most wasteful cooks and liberal feeders among civilized men. As soldiers their first demand is quantity and this demand is based on previous habits, not on present needs. The statistics of supplies and trains that have heretofore been necessary to bring supplies to an American army are so enormous, in figures so near infinity that they fall uncomprehended upon the ear.

Our citizen generally has not yet become professional. He is usually ready and willing to undertake to do anything. This is a most valuable military quality. For instance, his unprofessional character as a soldier sometimes greatly enhances his military value as an officer. If he have military genius, it will be unhampered by fixed rules of military procedure and tradition. He needs and will follow only hard common sense, leaving off red tape and adopting the quickest, simplest, most direct methods. After soldiers are made, such a man as an officer knows well how to work them to success.

Most noteworthy in our volunteer is another general quality manifested in regard to the line of communications of the command to which he belongs. He must know it either well guarded or else boldly abandoned. There can be no mean yet safe course with him in this respect. If such be attempted it is likely to turn the first skirmish into a disaster as with the Federals at Balls Bluff where an unfounded fear as to this line led to a wild flight and dreadful slaughter, or the Confederates at Rich Mountain where McClellan won a battle by a mere threat. But let no commander of volunteers who desires and has good reasons to do so, fear boldly to abandon his line of communications and to let his men know it. If they have the least confidence in him and understand his reasons, their discipline, energy and boldness instantly increase fourfold. They are on their mettle. Every man conceives a personal responsibility for the success of the movement, and if possible he will make it a success. The most daring and successful operations, the most brilliant and effective results, the greenest laurels in this field are the American volunteers. Remarkable illustrations in the Mexican war are Doniphan's expedition, Kearney's California trip and Scott's march to the City of Mexico. More wonderful still, as executed in the presence of a worthier foe, are Grant's march from the Mississippi toward Jackson and return, leaving the enemy's large army in his rear and almost on his path, Sherman's march to the sea, Stuart's cavalry raid, June, 1862, and Grierson's dashing and effective raid from Jackson, Tenn., to Baton Rouge, La.

Before his first battle the volunteer generally manifests an overweening self-confidence and conceit. I point to the two great armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia at the first Bull Run, before battle ridiculous in their impatience and brag; after it, one crest-fallen and ashamed in defeat, the other in helpless confusion in victory. This self-confidence is not generally thought so serious a fault or a fault at all, yet it is a feeling against whose possible results a commander must make careful provision. At Belmont the Federals' first dash sweeps away the Confederate lines. Inexperience and conceit make them think that they have everlastingly cleaned out and driven off the enemy. They stop, scatter and mix. A few officers see the danger and try to guard against it. They endeavor to collect their men. The latter, cock-sure that the Confederates dare not face them again, yield but slowly and the officers have such poor success that when the enemy returned, as he quickly did, the late victors were almost hurled into the river.

The more serious defect of unsoldierly independence renders the volunteer at first unwilling and slow to perform those duties in their nature implying subordinate position. Such are waiting for the orders and adhering to the plans of a superior, reports of their own movements and actions, the collection and transmission of intelligence. At Fair Oaks it destroyed all unity of action. Division and brigades on both sides went into and out of battle independently, without orders, without reports, and the only results of bravery and hard fighting were carnage and disorganization without decision. A colonel of cavalry in Northern Mississippi saw a long column of Confederate mounted men moving north. He neglected to report to his general until the mounted infantrymen, Van Dorn, had marched around General Grant's army, reached its line of communication, cut it, captured the main depot at Holly Springs and ended the campaign by necessitating the retreat of the whole Federal army.

The volunteer is especially nervous about his flank or rear. Over against this, however, stands the fact that he is quickly rallied and reorganized, and then sets himself with determination to prevent further disaster or even retrieve the day. Germantown and Brandywine are examples. Under such circumstances he appears at his greatest bravery.

With regard to this quality, bravery, you may surely not count him the possessor of that stolid stuff which will allow him to be made a target of. He hasn't it. He cannot be made to stand quietly and be shot down. He will sacrifice himself, but not thus. He will rush into the jaws of death in the excitement and glory of action, but I know of no instance where he has stood stock-like and died or even passively received blows in order to occupy the enemy while his comrades in another direction are gaining some advantage.

Nor, it seems, can he be relied upon to defend permanent works subject to long siege or bombardment. If he must sit and be shot at in a closed fortification, he soon yields. The Confederates would not defend Island No. 10, nor Henry, nor Donelson, nor Pulaski, nor the forts below New Orleans. Their losses in each of these cases were trifling, yet the moral effect was unbearable, overwhelming their spirits. Striking examples from the opposing side were Harper's Ferry, which fell with 11,000 able defenders at the shriek, we may say, of Jackson's first shell; also the small but well equipped and manned posts in Kentucky and Tennessee, that yielded often at the bare threat of bombardment by the partisans Forrest and Morgan.

Briefly as to tactics, for use with volunteers tactical principles, not systems of tactics, are needed. Napoleon taught us that if we must fight with untrained men, being unable to adapt the men to tactics, we must try to adapt the tactics to the men. To attempt to use elaborate, high formations and complicated movements with volunteers is a gross disregard of this great principle and the last folly. Make the best of those simple movements which volunteers have had time to learn. Without regard to prescriptions of tactical systems, try to suit your battle formations to the character of your men, to the needs of the hour, and, above all, to the chances of success, remembering that in the beginning with volunteers it is better to lose ten thousand men than one fight. Men lost in victory are more easily regained than morals lost in defeat.

American armies are made up of many nationalities, and are thus the average resultant of all. To handle them successfully requires in a commander the utmost versatility of genius, always upon observation to avoid difficulties of character and disposition, always alert, to know how and quickly to turn their characteristics, pride, or passion to the advantage of his cause. These needed qualities in a commander found striking exemplification in some commanders of the Army of the Potomac in the various battles before Richmond. That army contained many Irishmen, even whole regiments. By skillfully connecting England with the Confederate cause, by bearing the green flag beside the Stars and Stripes in time of stress, by any expedient arousing toward the Confederates the old Irish hatred of England, these wild fellows were made to fight like very devils.

In opposing Banks advance upon Shreveport, the Prince of Polignac in similar manner turned to profitable account the French characteristics of some Louisiana regiments. I mean to say that local pride and characteristics, and the customs and traditions of the men composing any given body of troops furnish the strongest hold upon them. With fresh volunteers these things take the place of the veteran trained or professional soldiers' professional pride, military honor, esprit de corps and corps traditional, rather than be untrue to which traditions he will grimly add a glorious death to this heritage of his surviving comrades. Better armed than with a just cause is the commander who shall know and know how to take advantage of this thing.

Politics taint volunteer troops in every stage of enlistment, organization, discipline and command. Through politics the private directs his general. Politics dictated from McClellan's headquarters in '62 the dangerous general order calling the attention of his army to the blunders of Mr. Lincoln's Republican administration. Politics also sent Lee to Gettysburg.

Newspapers oppose often serious obstacles to the smooth management of volunteers. They reach and affect everybody. By intemperate criticism they create dissatisfaction, questioning and insubordination. It is doubtful whether the extreme state of demoralization existing in Burnside's army after Fredericksburg was due more to defeat or the rabid utterances of the newspapers.

In the leadership of volunteers in battle itself we may note three things as very important, if not essential, for success with them: First, a correct plan. With all troops and under all circumstances this is of the utmost importance. With volunteers it is essential, for one simple reason: Once in motion in battle they may perhaps be stopped or withdrawn, but not turned. Second, a personal leadership at the head, not directly from behind. "Example," to the volunteer, "is better than precept," and he demands to see his officers lead the way where they desire him to go. Third, leadership of high rank. The volunteer cares but little for his company officers. He regards his colonel more, but his general is the first superior for whom he feels any great respect. To the question, "Who was your commander?" our old war volunteer always replies, "General So and So."

We read that Hancock repulses Early at Williamsburg, "leading in person, sword in hand;" that Jackson leads "in person" at Port Republic; that Johnston, Confederate commander-in-chief at Fair Oaks, "rushes in person in the midst of the fight leading a brigade." Such examples are guides. These officers were great commanders of volunteers. If the place of the leader had not been here they would not have been here.

Let the officer, regular or volunteer, who would in case of a great war undertake the organization, training and leading of volunteers, measure himself. A great demand will be made upon him. To meet it he must bring besides knowledge, decision, resolution and bravery, an infinite tact and patience, a long-suffering and perseverance that will enable him to meet with unruffled temper the harassments, the daily frets and worries, most of them based on trifles or nothing at all, of handling inexperienced, touchy soldiers. Nor can ambition be his sole incentive. That cannot suffice. He must be stayed in his purposes by a stronger and nobler passion—patriotism.

II. THE VOLUNTEER AS I HAVE SEEN HIM.

(From Notes During Spanish-American and Philippine Wars.)

War has come and gone. From first to last my lot was cast with the volunteer, negro and white man, Southerner, Northerner, Westerner, mountaineer, plainsman. Now that I have seen him, commanded him, slept, eaten, lived and fought with him, how does he impress me?

He is always criticised. Before those who have commanded him he needs no defense. To his honor and credit be it said that those who have seen him oftenest, who have inspected him most closely, who have served with him and know him best, esteem him most. To them this article does not speak, but to those who have seen him afar or commanded him little, it does, that they may see his virtues and think not alone of his faults, that his high qualities of patriotism, enthusiasm, energy and dash may not be refused high valuation on account of the lack of that military finish which alone distinguishes him from the regular.

From the test of service under my own eye in camp, in campaign and in battle, he has emerged to my mind with virtues looming and vices dwindling. If I laud him greatly, think not that it is for his lack of training, but in spite of it. If I hold him high, say not that I belittle the training of the regular or would leave it off, but that I rejoice in the conviction that, great regular army or none at all, we have a hope: the volunteer as he is, as he comes to the colors, is a mighty bulwark to this nation.

In the outward forms and marks of respect to rank and authority he is generally wanting, but this means no serious lack, no disabling defect at heart. Form is not substance nor sign the thing signified. Those who have noted and with most gusto criticised him for this fault are heard no more when comes the hard test of service and of battle.

The volunteer is a soldier from choice and patriotism, not from other motives. He is, therefore, always an advocate and enthusiast for the war that he comes to fight, ever in sympathy with the purpose and the policy of his government. The military value of this thing in all operations is incalculable. It sends men without complaint, with enthusiasm to the most disagreeable, the most arduous, the most unpromising labors. It was a pre-eminent characteristic of our Philippine volunteers and made them the peers of the best regular troops in all energy, zeal

and activity. It won them the warm regard of all zealous supporters of the government and the flag. Let it be put down, let it be remembered ever to their credit.

War is no longer in our day an issue at arms alone; it is fought out with all modern devices and appliances, and that side wins which can best marshal the skill and the aid of all professions and all vocations. In the ranks of almost every volunteer regiment can be found every kind of man, every profession, every ability that war can call for—doctors, lawyers, engineers, mechanics, laborers, clerks, telegraphers, bridge-builders, boatmen, engine-drivers, mule-drivers, railroad-men, machinists, everything. There is nothing that they are not, nothing that they cannot do. In the Philippines my own volunteer regiment, while campaigning and fighting, furnished men who knew how to build and who did build and operate telegraph and telephone lines, roads, bridges and water works, run steamboats and ships; make, execute and administer law, and establish government in all its branches. A New York regiment, annoyed in movement by a railroad strike in Cuba, found men in its ranks who knew how to take charge of the road, and they did in effect so take charge of it and operate it as long as they needed. Could the average regular regiment have done so much? I doubt it, for, in the matter of having all kinds of men in the ranks, few regular regiments can come up to the average volunteer.

From the life of the professional soldier the military law of promotion according to seniority has largely excluded competition, which is the principle of progress and the triumph of the fittest. To hold his own, nay even to advance, it would almost seem that he sometimes has but little more to do than to breathe on; it is not necessary for him to surpass competitors. Such conditions can have but one effect—stagnation. Not so with the walks of life from which come our volunteers. Their minds are kept bright and keen with the competition of their fellows, and so they come to the colors. This one thing, I have repeatedly had occasion to note, has gone far, often all the way, toward wiping out the inferiority of the volunteer's training. It was a keen-witted volunteer that designed and executed the capture in the very center of his camp, from the very midst of his men, of the most daring and troublesome guerilla chieftain of the Philippines, the notorious Arturo Howard.

Was it hard, as the books had told me, to secure the volunteers' obedience? It is hard to secure obedience from any soldiers, regulars or volunteers, but concerning volunteers I assert and believe I have with me all who have lately commanded them, that when once volunteers are convinced that their commander knows his business, their obedience is forever his; it becomes something wonderful; it is unhesitating, unquestioning, loyal to a degree that is positively delicious, exhilarating, inspiring to a commander. Ask regular officers who commanded them in the Philippines. They haggled not over fine points of regulations. Their question was, "Does the colonel order it?" "Yes." It is done. The memory of this is a joy to all whose duties then put upon them the doing of a thousand things that were never dreamed of in the philosophy of the army regulations.

Patriotic? Hereon I need say no word. If he were not, he would be no soldier, for he is one of his own will.

Brave? He does such deeds as this: A soldier of mine, single-handed and alone, without food and without drink, wounded, burned and bruised, for five whole days from the head of a cannon fought two companies of Aguinaldo's insurgents. He literally shot them to a standstill; he killed some thirty men, and being at last too weak and exhausted to stand, and unable longer to bear the stench of dead enemies about him, he crawled away, undiscovered. Dragging himself along, he saw a patrol of the enemy, and without need, of his own accord, opened another fight with these. His shots brought comrades to find him weakly but calmly sucking an orange beside the body of his last victim.

Soldiering, the vocation of the professional, is the avocation of the volunteer. To the former it is the usual humdrum; to the latter, a well-spring of novelty; his enthusiasm bubbles and effervesces; he rushes headlong at the smallest things; all is so new to him. That is foolish, you will say. I answer, it works sometimes the most wonderful results. It may lead him into many absurdities; it is likely at any time to run him into a deed that electrifies the world. A little volunteer

in the Philippines was constantly running out on wild-goose chases after every guerilla and partisan he could hear of in the woods. He got himself greatly laughed at until one day he bagged the head of the whole insurrection, Aguinaldo himself.

In war, of all things originality, new methods, are likely to prove successful because the most unexpected. Military training is unfortunately too often synonymous with surrender of individuality and originality. Set methods, rigid uniformity are its rules, and both officers and enlisted men are apt to fall into the habit of using nothing else themselves and expecting nothing else from the enemy. Not so with the volunteer. He is fresh from among a people whose originality, whose schemes and innovations keep the world dazzled. No traditions bind him, no set methods guide him; the circumstances and conditions of each case lead him. He is likely to be full of the most valuable originality and he is ever on the alert for the like in the enemy. It was a volunteer, the adjutant of my own regiment who caught, broke up and punished the smuggling by the enemy of great numbers of cattle into the city of Manila during the worst days of Aguinaldo's insurrection. It was another, my major, who did this: After three officers, his seniors, had apparently decided such passage impossible, he managed with his horse's picket-rope to cross two of his companies over a deep canyon in Southern Luzon, saving its passage by a single sunken road under the enemy's deadly fire and flanking from an otherwise almost impregnable position a great force of the enemy without the loss of a man. To the trained, educated regular officer I hope our country will continue to add the direct, original, fresh-minded citizen-so the volunteer.

He overdoes the hero business sometimes. Let him. By this he alone brings, to him alone is due, those rare periods and flashes of willingness in our people to appreciate a soldier at all. For this I, for one, as a soldier salute and thank him.

And blows his own horn. What can be said to this? That the walls of Jericho went down before men who were blowing their own horns. That is the American way; it is the habit of enthusiasm, the expression of faith in ourselves, a faith that is even now literally moving mountains and casting them into the sea.

His common error is to think too much of formal drill, to hold it the first, almost the whole thing in soldiering. He is wrong. It is not only not the first, it is almost the last. Before it come feeding, hygiene, supply, equipment, discipline, almost everything. Drill, as generally understood—for battle it has become almost as much of a fantasy as the lance and the saber.

His main demoralization, his nightmare, his unconquerable aversion, the thing which he can never be brought to accept at all, is the unutterable system of reports and returns, the paper work, the red tape of officialdom. To the dogged resignation of the regular in this matter he will never come. To his last day of service you may count that he will, if he can, evade or dodge, law, regulation and custom hereon. He regards the whole system as an outrage of authority, the devilish device of bigots and egotists in high places.

As an officer, that which has oftenest and most justly subjected him to criticism has been not rendering to the government the things that are the government's. In the handling of government property, "overs," "excesses," "foundlings," "waifs" and "strays," "flotsam and jetsam," he is apt to regard as his own. Yet even here it is but fair to say that in many cases he treats them as the simple means of recouping himself for losses which he has sustained or is likely to sustain at the hands of what he considers the government's too straining system of accountability.

His predominant vice as a soldier is his independence, the exclusive mastership of self to which he has always at home been used, and which he is slow, very slow, to yield to military authority. His predominant virtue is his patriotism, his zeal, his readiness, his absolute anxiety to do something. To you who may command him in war I say use these and again use them. They will cover every vice.

When volunteers are gathered, you gather the intelligence and patriotism of the land. These are military assets of the very highest value. The commander who fails or neglects to use them is worse than a fool; he is a criminal.

After all, what is he? What manner of man? Pre-eminently a soldier for the service of his country. His faults are faults of inexperience mainly; they pass with time and training. Yet here we meet his gravest objection. Though he come

with all qualities and readiness, yet is he unprepared for a soldier's work? He comes with war when war comes; it is an end of preparation; the struggle is upon us. While war is in itself the very best training, it is also the most deadly. It trains, but it kills. In making its thousands of the finest and best, it kills its other thousands who pass as a shadow. He costs, this volunteer, at least himself and another. Fine, undoubtedly fine, he is, but he stands in the place of two, one of whom we see no more. But looking at him who lives, I have thought, surely he has snatched from death and added to himself the zeal, the energy, the enthusiasm and the patriotism of the comrade dying at his side.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major Twenty-eighth Infantry.

Late Colonel Third Alabama Volunteer Infantry (Negroes); Late Colonel Thirty-ninth Infantry, United States Volunteers.

At the conclusion of this paper, on motion, a rising vote of thanks was extended to Major Bullard.

Major Frank B. Rowley, First infantry, presented the following paper:
Mr. President and Members of the Minnesota National Guard Association:

Your executive committee has assigned to me the subject, "How Should Non-Commissioned Officers' Schools Be Conducted, and How Often Should They Be Held?"

In order to suggest some ideas of possible value to company commanders, relative to the conduct of these schools as applicable to National Guard organizations, a comparison of conditions as existing in the United States army and the National Guard will be in order, that arguments offered favoring certain features of these schools may be understood.

To begin with, the fact that non-commissioned officers' schools are regularly held in each regiment of the United States army can hardly be questioned; that they are to a certain extent overlooked in many organizations of the National Guard, or that they fail of producing satisfactory results, is, I fear, too true.

Paragraph 163 of the United States Army Drill Regulations I will quote: "The captain is responsible for the theoretical and practical instruction of his officers and non-commissioned officers. When instruction is not otherwise provided for by army regulations and general orders, he requires the officers to study and recite these regulations so that they can explain thoroughly every movement, the non-commissioned officers those movements up to and including the school of the company and the duties of guides in the school of the battalion."

Bearing in mind the fact that the National Guard differs from the regular army, in that its members are entitled to a voice in the affairs of their individual organizations, to a certain extent, at least, a right not bestowed on the regular army man, I wish to recall to the members of this association how often this voice is heard, often at length, tiresome, and in effect of questionable benefit to the organization, and to suggest a remedy, simple, effective and satisfactory.

Thus prefacing my remarks, permit me to, offer some suggestions relative to the subject assigned, that may be of service to company officers, particularly those who have been recently commissioned, and hoping that those of you who have been promoted to higher grade may, from your former service with companies or batteries, find more or less in my remarks you can indorse.

As to the frequency with which these schools should be held, there can be no doubt but that they should be held weekly, excepting, possibly, such period during the summer months as your organizations are not drilling. To suggest that they be held less often would be to recommend the cutting down of the opportunity for study to such an extent that your non-commissioned officers could not perfect themselves for the duties required of them. To hold them oftener would not be feasible. I do insist, however, that each officer and non-commissioned officer should feel it his duty, and be required, to devote at least two evenings each week to the affairs of his organization; one in perfecting his theoretical knowledge, the other in practical demonstration of what he has learned, on the drill floor. A man has no right to aspire to chevrons or shoulder straps unless willing to bind himself to devote this much time, at least, to the service of the

state and his company, and those of us who have been or are company commanders know how much more is required of the officer in command of the company.

Schools should be held on stated nights each week, other than drill night.

In offering suggestions as to the manner of conducting these schools, let us consider the following:

Who shall be permitted and who required to attend?

What amount of time should be devoted each evening to them?

Who shall be the instructor?

What shall be the scope of these schools, and how divide the time, in order to insure best results?

The propriety of devoting portion of the time to discussion of matters of purely company interest and policy.

As to who shall attend these schools. Every officer and non-commissioned officer should be absolutely required to attend, and it is the duty of the captain to satisfy himself that absentees have a legitimate excuse should they fail to appear on school night. We should go further, and encourage the attendance of every member. Not necessarily enforce attendance, but, if your schools are properly conducted, a large proportion of your membership will attend, finding same a source of both pleasure and instruction to themselves, and incidentally serve as a spur to your non-commissioned officers to prepare themselves more thoroughly for the subjects under discussion. Though this is foreign to the subject assigned to me, I cannot refrain, at this point, from suggesting to company commanders the advisability of making your appointment of non-commissioned officers strictly upon a basis of demonstrated worth and knowledge of military drill and regulations, such selections to be made in a strictly impartial manner, that there may be no doubt in the minds of your men that the best man will win out. The objection may be here raised by some that should appointments be made upon a man's ability to pass a high grade examination, the man himself might not prove to be suitable for the position simply because his theoretical knowledge gained him the place. From my own experience, I have demonstrated that appointments made after a thorough examination and practical demonstration of candidates' ability, before an impartial board, prove thoroughly wise and satisfactory in nine cases out of ten. Further, if a company commander makes his appointments, using his very best judgment, and does select the man who, in his opinion, is best fitted for the place, there are bound to be some ambitious men who will be disappointed, who will think, if they do not say, that the captain showed partiality in making his selection. If, on the other hand, every member felt that he had as much of an opportunity to receive appointment or promotion as his fellow in the ranks, competition for position would be strong, and the attendance at your schools would be increased by so many of the members as were ambitious enough and sufficiently interested in military matters to aspire to the possession of a warrant. It is needless to add that the efficiency of your company, as a whole, would thus be increased, by reason of the number of privates who were possessed of knowledge sufficient to act in the capacity of corporal, should occasion demand.

Two hours can be very profitably spent on your school nights. That it is wise to keep your non-commissioned officers longer, I question, but I am equally certain that, properly conducted, the entire time can be taken up without a sign of lagging interest on the part of anyone, and that the school will become, if it is not already, a source of pleasure as well as instruction to all.

As to who shall be the instructor, let me suggest that, while it is expected that the captain and his lieutenants shall conduct these schools, a very great benefit will accrue to all the non-commissioned officers if one of their number were occasionally required to conduct the school. This will not only cause them to apply themselves more thoroughly to study, but give them greater confidence in themselves, the lack of which is too often painfully apparent in all companies.

As to the scope of these schools and method of conducting same. As a suggestion, the time allotted to your school should be divided into three portions; first, study of the drill regulations. And in connection with this it is well for the captain to assign for study that portion to be taken up on the drill floor the next succeeding drill night. The covering of too much ground, either in school or

drill at one time, is unwise and tends to a useless repetition of certain movements that are familiar to the company commander, or that he knows the company can execute in a satisfactory manner. Let each officer who has been company commander, or is at present, consider whether or not this is true. Unless we have some absolute routine laid down, we will unconsciously, perhaps, wander off into "squads right," "column right," or other company movements of minor importance compared with others we are prone to slight. I would, therefore, divide the Drill Regulations and Guard Manual into four or five sections, making it a rule to cover same, both in school and drill, in four or five weeks, as the case may be. There is ordinarily too much time spent in close order movements in company, to the neglect of other and more important matters as extended order, etc. What we need is not exact precision in manual of arms and company movements, but a thorough working knowledge of everything between the covers of your drill regulations and guard manual, not only by yourself, but by every member of your organization. Therefore, by devoting, say, one hour only to the discussion of the drill regulations, both yourself and your officers come to drill the next week prepared to carry out the routine as laid down, and each prepared to perform the duties of a higher grade, if required.

I take it that we have all had the same experience regarding these schools at some time or another; where the officer conducting same came fortified with abundant knowledge of the subject, and who explained at length the proper manner of executing certain movements and the reason therefor. Now, this is all well and good, for we all appreciate a thorough knowledge of military matters in the one who is in command of our organization, and yet I can well remember myself, as a non-commissioned officer attending such schools, going to same with the best of intentions, and really gaining much needed information. And yet at times my mind would wander, in spite of my desire to do otherwise, and at others sleepiness would get the better of me, with the result that the close of the school was as much of a relief, yes, more, than the opening had been a pleasure. You know I am right, for you have all been there yourselves. Let us consider a remedy for this, for to insure best results you must fix and hold the attention of your men from start to finish. Let the instructor assume that he is entirely ignorant of the subject. Selecting a paragraph from the lesson, ask Sergeant Smith the proper explanation of the movement. When Sergeant Smith has expressed himself on the subject, ask Private Jones if he can discover any error or omission in the definition. Private Jones would be only too glad of an opportunity of showing that he is able to pick flaws in the theoretical knowledge of the non-commissioned officers, and Sergeant Smith would feel keenly his inability to answer correctly a question which a private could. By following out this line of questioning, selecting at random an officer, non-com or private, particularly one who shows signs of lagging interest, you have the solution of the difficulty, and I will add that every man, from the company commander down, will leave feeling that the time has been profitably spent. I can candidly say that, subsequent to the adoption of the above plan in my company, not a school was held that a line of discussion was not started which served to bring out some new point that had not previously occurred to either myself or one of the members. It is surprising what can be developed from a careful and repeated discussion of even the most simple movements, endeavoring to ascertain why this movement is executed in such a manner, questioning if the work of the board responsible for the preparation of the Drill Regulations could not be improved upon if we were given the opportunity. By such a line of discussion you are brought to a consideration of the relation this particular movement may have to some other in company or battalion drill, and the matter thus impressed upon the minds of all present. Take nothing in the book for granted, but look for a reason for everything, and you will be able to find it, surprising yourself that you had not discovered it before.

It is important that, say, half an hour be devoted to taking up study other than that covered by Drill Regulations, as outpost duty, rudiments of military law, Firing Regulations, synopsis of Army Regulations, or any other subject your non-commissioned officers should be familiar with.

Finally, half an hour or less can be very profitably devoted to the discussion of matters of company interest with those who are present, securing the ideas

of as many as possible, and from which you can form opinions relative to the conduct of your company that will be of great value to you. In many organizations it is the custom to hold so-called "business meetings" on drill nights, sometimes once a month, often every week, at which such subjects as when and where to hold the next dance, what to do with certain moneys that happened to be on hand in the treasury, and a thousand petty things are discussed, keeping the members after drill until 11 o'clock or later to listen to the arguments of one or two men who seldom come to drill, and who are determined to make enough noise to make up for the deficiency, irrespective of the fact that they do not know what they are talking about. Therefore, I say, do away with your meetings, entirely if you can, or hold them as seldom as possible. Get your ideas from the men who are interested enough to be what they are and where they are on school night, and then go on and carry out the ideas you have gained. More can be gained in half an hour in this way, yes, in fifteen minutes, than by spending two hours in general discussion in company meetings. We cannot fail to give our members a voice in certain matters of company policy, but I do say restrict it as much as possible, and to the men who are the brains of your organization.

To summarize, make your selection of non-commissioned officers very carefully in every instance; give the privates encouragement to hope that at some future date they may become one; hold your non-commissioned officers' schools regularly on evenings other than your drill night, covering that portion of the drill regulations to be taken up by the company the next week, and announcing at the close the subjects for discussion at the next school, thus giving your men absolutely no excuse for not being prepared, and finally utilize all the gray matter possessed by those in attendance in formulating your policy for the betterment of your organization.

Finally, as a member of the examining board, I wish to impress again upon company commanders the necessity of having your military library easily accessible to the non-commissioned officers, in fact to all of your men, and encourage them in making a study of same. They will need this information sooner or later. The time is past when a candidate for commission can receive same simply by reason of the fact that he is a good fellow, well recommended by his superior officers, and able to pass a fair examination only, squeezing his markings a trifle more or less, according to his length of service and record of past efficiency. The result will be that we are assured of a higher class of officers than has (very fortunately) been the case in a very few instances in the past. Set the standard higher in your own organization and insist that your non-commissioned officers be more efficient than ever before, for herein lies the secret of success in your company, and the assurance that any non-com who is elected to fill a vacant commission shall be able to pass a satisfactory examination.

The Minnesota National Guard is efficient, active, progressive, but let us not feel over-confident in the strength of our organization.

There is room for improvement, and the best way to insure same is to take the enlisted man and train him as thoroughly as may be with the limited time at our disposal. fitting him for a warrant first, and making of him, when the time comes, a first-class officer.

In discussing this subject, Colonel Gerlach advocated more work to improve the non-commissioned officers of the companies, setting forth their importance to the Guard.

Captains Schaefer, Luers and Maltby spoke of methods in their companies. Lieutenant Clark, brigade staff, told of the advantages of the post school at Fort Snelling, expressing the hope that more officers would attend the sessions.

Adjournment was here taken until 10 o'clock the following morning.

In the evening a number of the officers attended the Metropolitan theater in a body, and afterwards repaired to the Commercial Club, where a Dutch lunch was served. Major Clark, acting as toastmaster, introduced several officers, who responded to various toasts.

SECOND DAY—MORNING SESSION.

The convention, having reassembled, was called to order at 10:20 A. M. Lieutenant Colonel Frank T. Corrison, First infantry, presented and read the following paper, prepared by Col. Resche, who was unable to attend the convention.

To what extent should the regular course of rifle practice be followed? First, at the home range; second, at the annual encampment; third, at the fall camp of instruction, and other competitive meetings; and who should participate therein in order to obtain the best general results with the least expenditure.

The course to be followed should be as nearly that of the regular army as time, range and circumstances permit. The question of expense is not taken up, as that lies entirely with the Adjutant General.

1. AT THE HOME RANGE.

Each company should have a home range. Complete reports of the range facilities of each company should be made and placed on file. An officer of each company should be placed in charge of the practice on the home range, and systematic work done under his supervision. All members should be required to practice on the home range. If it is not large enough for all at the same time, the work should be done by squads, or sections, so that each one may have an opportunity to shoot, and not be obliged to lay around all day waiting his turn. Competition matches should be arranged and prizes offered. There are but few men who will keep steadily at practice unless there is some inducement offered.

In addition to competition matches and prizes, I believe where companies have ranges, captains should require non-coms to be at least marksmen. The men cannot be taught to shoot unless the officers and non-coms know how to teach them. Officers are generally selected from the non-coms, and if this qualification is required you will soon have officers who can shoot and who are able to properly instruct others. If it is suggested that many present non-coms, who are capable and efficient in their other duties, cannot qualify, the rule could be made to apply to future appointments. This important part of a soldier's business should not be overlooked. If the medical examination required in the Guard is followed, there is no reason why any man who becomes a member of the Guard should not with practice be able to make a qualifying score as a marksman. It might take a year or two to get the system under way, but when once started commanding officers will be surprised to find how easy it is to appoint a non-com from among the marksmen of his company. I have tried it as a company commander, and know how it works. Men who had ambitions, knowing that one of the things necessary in order to be a non-com was to be a marksman, took a great interest in the range; and within two years from the time the system was inaugurated every officer and non-commissioned officer of the company was either a sharpshooter or a marksman, and at camp one year the company qualified sixteen sharpshooters and thirty-four marksmen. So I may say the system has been tried and found to be an efficient one. Of course, there are other things than ability to shoot to be considered in appointing a non-com, but the ability to shoot should be taken into consideration as well as ability to drill.

The course should be the same as the one adopted at camp. It should include practice in rapid fire and skirmishing. Many men shooting on home ranges never attempt to skirmish, and it is a new experience for them when they go to camp. If skirmish targets are not on hand, the practice can easily be done on the "B" target. The particular target is not so important as the practice.

In my opinion, too much time is spent on the 200-yard range at home practice. Experience in matches show that they are not usually won or lost by the scores made at the short ranges. The range officer should see that the men shoot just as much at one range as the other. There is no particular reason, because the firing regulations mention 200 yards first, that a man cannot shoot at 500 or 600 yards first. But it seems thoroughly planted in the mind of the average range officer that 200 yards must be finished before shooting is done at any other range. More experience at the longer ranges will make a better shot at 200 yards. If a man can get the correct elevation and windage at 500 and 600 yards, and make a good score at these firing points, I would have no fear of his score at 200 yards.

Upon a requisition, accompanied by a certificate that a company has home range facilities, the state should issue the necessary known distance and skirmish targets and frames, pasters, etc., and these should be carried on property returns.

Ammunition for practice should not be issued to companies who do not have home range facilities. Home range work should be encouraged by the state, and as large an amount of ammunition issued to companies who expend it on the home range as the state can afford. An allowance should be made at the commencement of the shooting season, and further allowances made from time to time upon requisitions and certificates showing it properly expended.

Monthly reports should be made of qualifications on home range, and all qualifications made prior to camp on home range should be reported and decorations issued at camp to all those entitled to them. Qualifications made after camp should be duly reported and decorations issued at the end of the shooting season. Medals are not very expensive and are highly prized by a young enthusiast.

AT THE ANNUAL ENCAMPMENT.

It is true that shooting takes a large share of our time at camp, but in my opinion a great deal of time is wasted on the range; and I believe with proper supervision there is plenty of time to follow the present course of practice. Our camp is a camp of instruction, for shooting as well as our other duties; and every member in camp should be compelled to be on the range at the times fixed. If the officers as a rule had more knowledge of shooting, much of the time now wasted would not be. Proper executive work on the range is needed more than efforts to curtail the time spent on the range or the amount of ammunition expended.

I believe the best results can be obtained by the following plan:

Each battalion should be assigned a day on the range, and be excused from furnishing all guard and other details, and from battalion and regimental drill; but required to participate in parades at night. Every member of the battalion should be on the range. Two hundred, 300 and 500 yards, the marksman's course, can easily be completed in a day. This will take three days. The fourth and subsequent days the range should be open only at such times as will not interfere with battalion and regimental drills and maneuvers. The fourth day can be used for all rapid fire and 600 yards. It does not take as long to shoot at 600 yards as at 500, as only the better shots reach the 600-yard range, and the practice proceeds quicker. Rapid fire, with proper executive work in carrying it on, is a small matter and very quickly finished. Competitors can score for each other under the supervision of the range officers. Unless weather interferes, skirmishing can be closed on the fifth day. This will leave sufficient time for long-distance shooting, and the regimental and company team matches.

Scorers: About half the time in skirmishing is absolutely wasted in getting spotters and marking the targets. Scorers should be detailed for this duty. Enough range officers should be detailed in the pit so that the targets could be marked and ready by the time the skirmishers get off the range.

Range: An additional pit and targets should be constructed 100 yards nearer the firing points than the present one. This would allow shooting at 200 and 300 yards, and 500 and 600 yards, at the same time, and save a large amount of time. If a new pit could be placed so as to allow 800 and 1,000 yards shooting at the same time it would also help a great deal.

Shot Spotters: These should be used continuously. They would save much of the time now spent in calling for "the last mark."

Rapid Fire: I believe the strap should not be used in rapid fire at 200 yards. It can probably be used to advantage at 500 yards, for I believe that as long as we use the strap in skirmish firing, using the prone position, it may not so seriously interfere with getting the proper aim. I have always been a believer in the use of the strap, but recent experience and observation at Sea Girt has convinced me the strap is more of a detriment than a help in the rapid fire at 200 yards.

Wind Clocks: Should be placed all around the range in addition to our present flags. I should not advocate the discarding of the range flags until we have had some experience with the wind clocks.

I do not believe the placing of an expensive wind indicator on our present range would be of much benefit. We do not get a steady wind, but it comes from all directions, and what is indicated as the wind at any one point on the range is not always—as many of us know from experience—any indication of what the wind is at some other point. I believe the wind clocks would give us more information at much less expense.

Field Glasses: The state should furnish the field officers and captains with field glasses for range work. These should be issued only to officers who are charged with the accountability of property.

Skirmish Targets: These targets should be placed in advance of the present pit, and for a distance of at least twenty-five feet the bank should be covered with light-colored sand. The targets should be so set that they would be about the center of the sand, so they can be readily seen.

Regimental Teams: There should be a competition match for positions on the regimental teams, open to all sharpshooters qualifying that year, and all distinguished riflemen, and in addition such nominations as the regimental commander may make, in case there are not enough competitors. The high men in this competition would compose the regimental team and be published in orders, with the right of the team captain after his appointment to replace any member thereof before entering competition at the fall tournaments.

Score Cards: In printing score cards spaces should be left for the sighting shots, and they should be duly entered.

AT THE FALL CAMP OF INSTRUCTION AND OTHER COMPETITIVE MEETINGS.

The tournament should be open to regimental teams and all distinguished riflemen in the Guard. It takes a lot of hard work to become a distinguished rifleman, and an opportunity to participate in competitions would be an inducement for these men to stay in the service, and a deserved recognition of their work.

The fall tournament should be four days, and two days of preliminary practice.

First day: In the morning, 200, 300 and 500 yards; in the afternoon, 600, rapid fire and skirmish. Second day: In the morning, 600, rapid fire and skirmish; in the afternoon, 200, 300 and 500 yards. Third day: Regimental and company matches. Fourth day: The state team match.

State Team: If it is to enter the national match, it should be composed of at least twenty men. There should be no question of what men engaged in the practice are to go on the trip. Though they may not shoot on the team, they should be given the practice, taken on the trip, and used in some capacity. By keeping a lot of men on edge all the time endeavoring to make a good enough score to keep a place on the team makes the practice an individual match, and does not allow for any experiments or team work. Directions of the team captain in the preliminary practice should be followed, without the result affecting the position of the men on the team.

Guns: New guns should be issued to competing teams. The Krag is not accurate at long ranges after 1,500 shots.

Sea Girt: The Guard is to be congratulated upon the showing of the state team at the national match, and the thanks of the Guard are due to Adjutant General Wood for his successful efforts in taking the team there. I believe every member of the team gained a great deal of information. We "absorbed" many things, and they come to the surface every little while; the members of the team were from the different regiments, and the information obtained will gradually be disseminated, and we shall all be the gainers.

We learned many things, but the principal one was that Minnesota's team could shoot better than some twenty-five other state teams.

Mr. President and Members of the National Guard Association:

To me has been assigned the subject: "To What Extent Should the Regular Course of Rifle Practice be Followed." I am at a loss to understand why this

assignment should have been made to one who the inspector of small arms practice says reminds him of a certain owl, when there are such abler men as our newly appointed assistant inspector of small arms practice, who would rather shoot than eat or sleep, or that dark horse, the tail-ender of the Sea Girt team, whose record cards overshadowed us all.

By my subject I presume is meant, what method should be followed to teach new men the way to shoot in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of money and ammunition.

First, on the home range—It is the most important for a recruit to know how to sight his rifle properly, take the proper position for aiming and be able to pull the trigger without deranging his piece. Therefore, such drills as laid down in the firing regulations cannot be held too frequently, and many a soldier can be taught how to shoot without a useless waste of ammunition.

These sighting and aiming drills should first be held in the armory without any ammunition in order to teach the recruit how to handle his piece and work the mechanism properly. Then dummy cartridges should be used and when the lessons are thoroughly understood, and not until then, should a man be allowed to fire on the range or with ball cartridges. This knowledge cannot be acquired on the target ground. At that place the time that can be given to instruction is limited.

On the home range the mistake is often made of allowing a man to fire ten shots at 200 yards and when ten misses are recorded, of allowing him to go back to 300 yards and repeat the performance without any one trying to correct him or ascertain what is at fault—sight, position, trigger pull or condition of rifle. Such a man, after not being able to score a hit at 200 yards, instead of being permitted to fire at a longer range, should be taken up to 100 yards or even to 50 yards and allowed to fire from that point until he can at least hit the target.

Very few companies in the state are fortunate enough to have ranges where shooting over 500 yards can be practiced, accordingly, all the shooting is done at 200, 300 and 500 yards and no attention whatever is paid to time or rapid fire and to the skirmish. The first two have only been adopted by the government of late and the other has always been the weakest point of the majority of soldiers, therefore, more time should be given to these firings.

Skirmish and time fire should not be entirely left for camp, where the time for rifle practice is limited and there is practically no opportunity except for firing two record scores. In running the skirmish on the home range, if 500 yards is the extreme range, the first halt at 600 yards, that is, the first two shots called for in the firing regulations, could be omitted to secure this practice; but, of course, such scores could not be recorded.

Something should be done to increase the attendance on the home range, either by making it compulsory to a certain extent, or by offering some incentive to encourage a more general attendance during the practice year. Too many go to camp and there go on the range who never fired, or even saw a shot fired at a target and, therefore, cannot be expected to make a satisfactory score. On the home range there is a lack of thorough, systematic instruction. Often recruits are taken, or asked to go on the range, and while there practically no attention paid to their shooting, the time being taken up by older men and good shots who do not need the practice as much as the new men.

Speaking for the regiment of which I have the honor of being a member, which generally goes to camp early in the season, before there is any opportunity for practice on the home range, very few men have a chance to qualify for sharpshooter during camp, on account of lack of previous practice. Others are prevented from going to camp on account of sickness, business or other causes. For such, who are not able to qualify at camp, provision should be made for allowing them to qualify on the home range just before the close of the practice year by detailing the inspector of small arms practice or some field officer to superintend the shoot, provided, of course, facilities for the skirmish run are available.

Second, at the annual encampment—With the limited range facilities and an eight-day camp, with one day going, one day returning, one Sunday, and allowance for inclement weather, very little practice can be expected. It is almost impossible to do more than have each man fire his two record scores, as provided in

course "C," firing regulations. The regimental teams, and candidates for same, should be given an opportunity, after they fire their record scores and there is still time, to have additional practice, especially at rapid fire at 200 and 500 yards, skirmish and on the long ranges.

If the old rule, that shooting is to be done by battalions is to continue, some plan should be devised to reduce the number of "pick-ups" and enable men, who, on account of guard or other duty, are prevented from shooting with their battalion, to fire their strings at the next opportunity in order to give them an equal chance and they should not be left to the last day, as a good many are usually prevented from finishing their whole score on account of lack of time.

The blame for this does not lie with the range officers but with the company commanders. Too much laxity is shown about requiring men to show up on the range at the proper time.

With the present arrangement, the battalion on the range in the morning always loses a drill. While I consider rifle practice the most important part of the soldier's instruction and the hardest to acquire, it should not be allowed to interfere too much with drills, as camp is as much for battalion and regimental drills and field maneuvers as for rifle practice and it is the only time of the year that field officers have an opportunity to drill their commands. Of course, as long as the range facilities remain as inadequate as they are at Lake City, any satisfactory arrangement will be hard to make.

Some improvement might be made by utilizing the southerly end of the old pit by placing targets opposite the intervals of the targets in the new pit and thus the capacity of the range would be increased 50 per cent with very little expense. If this was done firing at 200 and 300 and 500 and 600 yards could be engaged in at the same time, and a man, after firing at either 200 or 500 yards, would not have to lay around and wait for all to finish at those points, or worse still, wander off to show up on the last day to finish, before the new range is opened, but could finish his string on the second range at once. That would reduce the number of "pick-ups" and would bring the men back to camp who would otherwise wait around on the range to finish their next score and would also permit the closing of the range in ample time so that the daily routine could be followed by all battalions.

I, of course, speak from my experience with the third infantry, as I do not know what arrangements they have in the other regiments.

If a suitable trophy, however little its value, was provided in each regiment for the company obtaining the best general average in scores, it would have a tendency to bring all the men on the range and so increase the general efficiency.

At the fall camp, the sharpshooters' course, eliminating the estimating distance drill, as laid down for the regular army, should be followed, as it includes all the features of the national shoot and gives men practice on ranges that they would not get if course "C," as provided for the militia, is followed. It also gives the man who selects the state team a chance to see what different men can do on ranges not shot at camp. It seems wrong to take eight men from each regiment because they happen to make a good score at the regimental team match and have them compete for positions on the state team as they may be entirely unreliable and not suitable for the same. If places on the state team must be won by competition, a fair way would be to take the twenty-four who have made the highest score in said match, regardless of the organization to which they belong.

For the regimental team, the team captain can pick his men in camp, but the state team should be picked by someone who attends the three regimental encampments, who has had an opportunity of watching the different men shoot, of learning their habits and see what they are capable of doing under various circumstances. The state team should be made up as soon as the regimental team match is finished and time taken for them to be thoroughly drilled and the weak points of the different men developed. They should be given an opportunity to experiment so that they may improve themselves in every way possible. Experience has taught that one who has participated in competition is preferable to one who has not, although I must say that in my experience at Sea Girt that some of the best records on the team were made by men who had never taken part in a competition before.

Our late war has taught us that when a call for troops is made that practically no time or facilities are available to teach men how to shoot and therefore it is necessary for us to instruct the troops while there is an opportunity. From the Boer war we learn that a man who knows how to handle his rifle properly is worth more than a whole company of men who do not know how to shoot. We should profit by that lesson and endeavor to increase the general proficiency of the entire force. The recent Russian-Japanese war shows that it is the man behind the gun that counts and all these conflicts illustrate that the strength of the army lies in the well instructed proficient enlisted men as well as in capable commanders and efficient staff.

To sum up: Teach every man in the armory, before any actual range practice, the position, aiming and sighting drills; on the home range, encourage every man to participate in target practice and inaugurate a more thorough systematic instruction. Compel every man to go to camp, where possible, and there to qualify for some decoration so that when the fall shoot takes place the team captains will have plenty of material to select his regimental team from and the Adjutant General will have no difficulty in selecting not one but probably a dozen teams to go to Sea Girt to compete for the national trophy.

Respectfully,

F. E. RESCHE,
Major Third Infantry, M. N. G.

In discussing the subject, Colonel Wright expressed the opinion that some method should be devised to lighten the target work at Lake City encampment, permitting more time for other instruction.

Captain O. E. Lee, brigade inspector small arms practice, stated that much time was lost at camp in getting the companies onto the range to shoot. He thought the suggestion that a second pit be prepared to enable simultaneous shooting at two ranges a good one. Suggested that each company be required to have one drill night a month devoted to instruction in rifle practice. Thought the company officers should instruct their men in shooting at camp, as the men become discouraged when not properly directed, and many possible good shots are thus lost. Suggested more team work at the fall shoot.

Lieutenant Clark criticised the company officers for lack of knowledge of firing regulations.

Captain Pratt, Third infantry, gave an entertaining talk on his experiences at the shoot of the Canadian militia at Winnipeg.

Captain W. S. Brisbin, quartermaster Third infantry, presented the following paper:

AGAINST.

When troops (companies) are scattered over a great extent of territory where the regimental headquarters and quartermaster especially, are separated from the organizations and have no good storage at their command, as they may in the new armories in St. Paul and Minneapolis, the establishment of "depots" would cause delay and consequent inconvenience, and would put labor on the regimental quartermaster, for which he could not be adequately compensated under present conditions. Rent, light, clerk hire, would involve expense for which no returns could be shown; the supply of the outlying scattered companies can be best effected from a central point—St. Paul—or wherever headquarters or a general storehouse is located.

As any order to mobilize must necessarily first come from central headquarters, the issue of tentage, etc., for field service, could be ordered at the same time the troops are called out and with the ample railway facilities we now have, supply could be insured more promptly, then if the troops would have first to make request

for issue to the distant regimental quartermaster before they could obey the order to move.

Another argument against depots is this, applicable to peace as well as war: The resources (financial) of the guard are limited; this demands the strictest economy in administration. Every dollar invested in surplus stock would rob somebody of some comfort. The necessity for quick supply does require the keeping on hand of a variety of sizes and with the many changes in the personnel of the guard the quantity of a reserve so needed would be the same at "each depot," as will now meet emergencies for the entire guard if kept at one place equally accessible to all. The danger of accumulation is therefore one-third only if present practice is continued.

It is practicable for regimental quartermasters if they will apply all the spare time they have at camp to acquire enough elementary knowledge of the methods of obtaining and accounting for supplies, furnishing transportation, etc., to enable them to study when at home to fit themselves reasonably well for field work without waste of means, and cause less labor and annoyance than that involved in the inauguration of the depot system, without pay for home work. Whenever the liberality of the state legislature and congress make it possible to pay regimental quartermasters and quartermaster sergeants for time necessarily given to the performance of their duties at home stations, then the law should be put in force and depots established; until then, we have simply a wise law but no means to execute it. As it is not mandatory, it would be well to follow the old proverb and "make haste slowly" in the premises.

Colonel O. J. Sweet, Twenty-eighth United States infantry, acting department commander, was introduced, and addressed the convention briefly.

Lieutenant Colonel Wm. Gerlach, U. S. A., retired, inspector Minnesota National Guard, presented the following paper:

DISCIPLINE IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.

We can assert without fear of successful contradiction that hardly any word in our military vocabulary is more frequently misquoted, we might say abused, than "discipline."

Broadly defined, discipline is a system of measures by which the conduct of a number of men combined into a whole, is circumscribed and controlled.

The character of the system required in a specific case is determined by the purpose for which the aggregation is formed, and the quality of its members.

Therefore, when we consider military discipline in the national guard, we should first of all answer the question, "who is to be disciplined?"

We have in the national guard bright young men, full of life. Considering how small are the rewards they receive for their voluntary service, we are compelled to acknowledge that, prompted by patriotism, they have assumed the obligation to fit themselves for the performance of the highest duty, which can be required of the sovereign citizen of our republic, viz.: "To offer life and all that is dear to man in defense of their government, state and national, against all their enemies whomsoever, domestic or foreign, and to protect against insult the flag which is the emblem of our nationality and the standard of the new civilization launched on the Western hemisphere by the noble patriots who framed our Declaration of Independence in 1776."

This answer to our question, incidentally, also reveals the purpose for which the national guard has been created.

As our time here is limited and our discussion is not speculative but practical, we need not enter upon a consideration why such duties are under our institutions imposed in part upon the militia of the states rather than upon a strictly national force maintained and controlled by the central government. This, however, we must keep in view: A strong element in the development of our national fighting power, indeed a part of our national forces, under the provisions of the militia bill of January 21, 1903, the national guard should be brought to the highest state of efficiency attainable with means provided by our legislators.

Now, with the purpose for which the guard is organized and the quality of the men who compose it before us, we can profitably discuss what shall be the character of the system of discipline by which it shall be governed.

The military discipline we need here should comprehend all that is necessary to train the soldier for the work of war. He must know how to handle his weapons to best advantage; this includes target practice, how to march, how to take care of himself in the field, preserving his strength at all times for the supreme effort. To overcome the enemy wherever encountered.

This part of the soldier's training should be thorough; we must build from the bottom up. It is comparatively easy to teach a company as a whole to march with a good front on parade, to go through the manual of arms creditably, or break nicely into column of fours; yet, this is but a small part of discipline, although necessary for our foundation.

While we develop the body let us not forget the governing power, "the soul." The psychological education must go hand in hand with tactical training. Tactical efficiency is only of use when rightly directed, and by this combination alone, we can reach that state of discipline which will insure success, and which is the pillar of the efficiency of an army. The increase in the power of our firearms due to modern inventions, must be met by increase of the moral force of the men who handles them. We have lost the close order, where the commander could control his line as far as his voice or bugle calls could reach. Nowadays a line is quickly scattered, out of the immediate control of the commander, almost before it is deployed; so, unless the man on the fighting line, every subordinate, high or low, makes the commander's aim his own, victory is impossible.

The growth of this discipline is slow. Its creation should be the care of the officer of every degree, on every occasion when he comes in contact with his men.

Now, as the officer is in all matters the soldiers' instructor and leader, he must be superior to him in knowledge, experience and strength of character. His personal bearing is of the greatest consequence, since his coolness and determination are reproduced in his men.

To produce discipline "authority" has been established. With authority responsibility is ever linked, and we cannot appeal too strongly to the esprit de corps of our national guard officers to fit themselves for their task; let all remember that to be able to lead they must prove their efficiency, to learn to command they must first learn to obey. By setting an example to their subordinates they will establish their right to exercise authority and secure the love and respect of their men.

It is worthy of our best efforts to accomplish this; it is a high honor to command the intelligent, self-respecting men we have in the ranks of our citizen soldiery.

Let us do our best to keep up the quality of the national guard and see that there is no deterioration of its members. This can be accomplished by care in recruiting. Make good by-laws, and then enforce them. No man should be allowed to enter the guard unless he is known, or has shown himself to be, while on the waiting list, or in the ranks during a reasonable period of probation, honest, faithful and intelligent.

Now, in closing my subject, I must refer to that part of a system of discipline which deals with the inherent weakness of human nature. Men will err; soldiers are full of spirit and sometimes overstep the lines and fail to observe orders and regulations. Here we must discriminate, but never forget that punishment should always be of a reformatory character—never revengeful; ever, swift and just—it will bring the man to his senses and exert a beneficial influence upon his comrades. Fortunately, where this does not meet the case and a vicious quality develops in the man who needs disciplinary punishment, we can under present regulations get rid of him.

For this purpose alone should the authority to discharge for the good of the service be exercised.

Let us approach, therefore, our duties with earnest zeal and establish in the national guard of Minnesota a system of discipline of a high order:

"Let us learn to do duty for duty's sake."

Then the guard will be ready, should war unfortunately come, to add to the bright pages in our national annals which now tell of the glorious deeds of Minnesota's Sons at Gettysburg, Nashville, Manila and in other battles.

Major C. T. Spear, First infantry, presented the following paper:
HOW TO SECURE BETTER ATTENDANCE AT DRILL.

The matter of securing better attendance at company drills is a question that lies almost wholly with the company officers. However, the field officers should be an important factor; by aiding the company officers in many different ways, by giving suggestions and, if necessary, orders, to change certain methods which have proved unsuccessful. It is necessary to make drills most interesting. I do not mean by this that officers should provide private theatricals, but I do mean that the officers and non-commissioned officers should be proficient, and vary weekly drills as much as possible, by making them interesting to the members. Give the lieutenants and non-commissioned officers a chance to drill, divide the company into squads and for twenty or thirty minutes let the corporals drill, giving them to understand that they must be alert to the occasion and inspire enthusiasm and interest in the drill, correct all errors, doing it quickly and not bore the men by being slow or uncertain about different explanations.

To make a success of anything it is necessary to have those accountable impressed with their responsibility. The corporal has a certain number of men assigned to his squad, if the company is properly managed, and he should be held accountable to the captain for the attendance of the men in his squad. The captain should not be called upon to go and see Private So and So, because he does not attend drill, until the corporal fails to bring about results. Neither should the captain even be called upon to write this private a letter, urging him to attend, until after the corporal has failed. If these non-commissioned officers are given the backing they are entitled to by the captain they will assume this increased responsibility with a great deal of interest, and it will be found that when a new private is assigned to a squad his non-commissioned officer will give the matter of teaching this new private his attention. The private will be interested and feel it a pleasure, as well as a duty to attend drill. Athletics should be encouraged, as well as different social affairs, after drill. The country companies have an advantage over city companies in that there is not so much going on. Social affairs and places of amusement are responsible for much of our poor attendance. Therefore we must strive to interest our members at drill by preparing advanced work and make each member, lieutenant, sergeant or corporal, as well as secretary and treasurer, perform the duty that belongs to his rank or position. I dare say that if the captain will divide the work of his company and have those perform the duty that belongs to them, and give half the attention towards seeing that they do perform their respective duties that he does in doing the work himself, he will have more time for thought and consideration, and get much better results. In a very short time all will be interested in their particular branch and the company will get much better turn-outs.

Adjournment was taken to 2 P. M.

C. T. SPEAR.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The convention, having reassembled, was called to order at 2 o'clock P. M.

Captain Schaefer, Third infantry, presented the following paper:

Limited as my experience military is, I could with even less suggest more ways to popularize the militia and keep up a maximum attendance at drill. I would say, as I did say five years ago, give the guard a roomy, well lighted, well heated hall and club room, a properly equipped and properly conducted gymnasium and the incentive will fill your ranks, but experience has taught me otherwise. I found that the more I babied the guard the worse the result. Given the proper spirit, and inconveniences and difficulties only add zest to military life. The average country company is made up of hardy young manhood capable of drilling out-of-doors, even in mid-winter if necessary, and why not? As children, we indulged in and enjoyed out-of-door sports, why not as men? If then our youth do not attend drill in the face of all the inducements that have been offered then we must conclude that the proper spirit is absent, and admit that we are on the

wrong track and that it is up to us, the officers of the guard, to find a cure. It is not lack of patriotism in our youth—there is plenty of that—but it requires a menace to our country to call it forth. The American militiaman is not a swash-buckler; he is a quiet unobtrusive gentleman lacking only perhaps because of his environment, a proper sense of his responsibility to his country in time of peace.

We have heard of the pleasant conditions existing in one company where non-coms. are perfect, and where Elysium has come, and we are glad of it, for we are all in sympathy with that company commander. It is a pity to disturb a happy dream of security, of immunity, from the blight that depopulates our drill halls, but experience has taught that sooner or later the same fate will overtake him that has been the common fate of us all.

We have all dreamt that dream; we built a fine armory, equipped it with a fine gymnasium, shower baths and all that. We aroused the same enthusiasm and it worked for a time and landed our company in the first place in the national guard of the state, from which exalted eminence we looked down with proud complacency upon our competitors. But the blight soon struck and gone was all our esprit de corps, all our pride of place. Why? Because it palled upon the taste; there seemed nothing to it, not even patriotism, because the men had performed their duties, they had learned their parts, they were ready for the call to duty, but it must be real duty, for they were the "real thing."

What commanding officer has not been thrilled with fine sensations when the beautiful machine that he had created with such infinite care and perseverance drilled him and itself into the first place in the brigade; but as it is, even with a horse, which reaches the climax of its power in one supreme test never to be reached again, so it is with the military company. But why mourn over this condition? The child is gone, perhaps dead, but there are other children. The two-minute horse came and passed away but another was trained to beat his record.

Another officer complained of the mortality of his non-coms. Within a few months he had to appoint an entirely new lot and seemed sorry for it. But I say to the captain of that company that he has done more for the service and more for his country in developing class after class of such soldiers and sending them out broadcast into the land, than if he had retained that magnificent lot of non-coms that he felt heir to when he assumed command of his company. The simple fact of their leaving has been a stimulus to the privates; it has been food for their ambition. We must not forget that the primary object of the guard is to train our young manhood for war. The same current that bears away your perfected soldier brings back the novice to your fostering care like clay to the hands of the potter. It is a joy to handle a well drilled company, but that is a selfish passion; our joy and ambition should take a wider range, we should strive to educate the largest number to the duties of a soldier. But there is lack of incentive for our young men. If we could hold out some inducement, if citing the case mentioned on yesterday by the distinguished soldier who spoke so eloquently of the volunteer before and after the Spanish-American war, if we could say there is an early possibility for a chance to emulate even that wonderful deed of bravery and endurance, or if we could give him some hope that it might be said of him: "Here is one, as it were, who with Sherman broke the backbone of the rebellion in that marvelous march from the country's center to the sea," or "there one who waded through the bloody shambles of countless battlefields under the silent all-conquering Grant," or "there one who stood by the rock of Chickamauga when that great wave of Southern valor broke against its crest," or "there goes a fragment of that thunderbolt of blue that Hancock hurled into the tidal wave of gray at Gettysburg and emblazoned the name of the first born regiment of our own beloved state first and foremost upon the scroll of fame," or "there is one who drew the sword of justice in a struggling brother's cause and wrote under the glorious record of his sire El Caney and San Juan Hill, Santiago harbor and Santiago, Manila harbor, Manila, and the countless battles in the distant Philippines, and taught the startled and wondering old world that the American shop keeper knew how to shoot." I say, brother guardsmen, that if it were possible to offer fame and military glory to the youth of America our drill halls would be overflowing.

National conditions have changed in recent years. We have taken to "world powering" now, mixing up in entangling alliances that we were warned against by the founders of the republic, and the young manhood of America must be prepared to enforce the edicts of congress and the president.

Congress has the power to marshal us to war and we have the right to demand that congress shall foot the bill for the cost of preparation. Let congress do that, let it turn to the use of the national guard but a tithe of the treasure that flows annually into the rat-hole, the river and harbors bill, and the national guard will erect the finest fighting machine that the patriotism and brain and brawn of man ever conceived since man's blood was first shed by man. This is a great country. We boast of our wealth; the surplus in the national treasury is at times so large as to be a menace to the welfare of the country. Why not use some of it in time of peace to prepare for war. Every able-bodied American citizen of certain age is in a sense a soldier, subject to draft in an emergency. If this is true, then our country ought to train its youth for its possible mission in life, by forcing him to attend drill, under properly constituted authority, at an age when his mind is still in a receptive condition, when muscle and sight can still be trained to make him a power in defence of his country. Every community ought to have its rifle range and a properly constituted corps of instructors in the handling and use of arms and of cover. Of two enemies, the one that shoots the quickest and straightest survives, and this must be true of armies in the field. Train the boys to shoot straight and shoot quick and America can whip the combined armies of the civilized world. So I say, give us a compulsory drill law, give us drill halls and rifle ranges in every community, give the men pay for their work, give us a traveling instructor to perfect our officers in the art of war and the care of the soldier, and inside of five years we could put in the field ten million of the best equipped troops, the best fighting machine, ever developed by man in all the annals of the world's history. I had not read the story of the Manassas campaign, but, feeling as I do, and under the license allowed by this meeting, I would, had I been a colonel in command of a national guard regiment, have said to the man on horseback: I will not allow these citizens of the republic, who, under proper conditions, stand ready to emulate the noblest deeds of history, to be used in such manner in time of peace to break the machine we are building for war. Not even the strenuous presence in the White House, that we all love and admire so much, has the right to destroy an engine of war in mere wantonness.

I am firmly convinced that the colonel who would refuse to cripple his command upon such an occasion, would so endear himself to it, that if the real emergency arose he could lead them, as gallant sturdy Colville lead the immortal First Minnesota at Gettysburg to victory or to heaven.

There is in my humble judgment too much leaning toward the partial elimination at least, of drill in our company quarters. That is a serious proposition. It would be the breaking of the one link, discipline, connecting the splendid bravery of the volunteer with his dangerous independence of action. It would destroy the fine touch between the leader and his fighting machine. I say, give us colonels fully posted in their duties, with a realizing sense of the limitations of their machines, and West Point will give us the Grants and the Lees, the Sher-mans and the Jacksons, the Sheridans and the Stuarts, the Bullards and the Parkers, to lead us on to glorious victory.

We must not be too severe with our men in our summer encampments. They sacrifice their vacations to attend these tours of duty and deserve much consideration. Give us just one "Manassas" at home and you depopulate the national guard.

Captain M. C. McMillan, First infantry, and Captain Albert Pfaender, Second infantry, spoke on this subject, which brought forth extended discussion.

Captain Murphy explained methods he had used as a battery commander to excite interest by dividing the battery in sections and offering prizes for attendance, perfection in drill, etc.

Captain Luers thought that esprit du corps was the secret of success with the companies, and that the officers should set the example in this respect.

Captain Lee expressed the opinion that the duties of the company commander should be divided with the subalterns and non-commissioned officers.

Colonel Van Duzee thought the company commander should be square with his men at all times. Advocated regimental canteen, which would eliminate liquor from the quarters. Colonel Van Duzee requested all present who favored such a plan to hold up their hands. The vote was unanimous in favor of the regimental canteen.

Captain Murphy explained the canteen system in vogue in the artillery, where tickets are issued to the men for a limited amount of beer only each day. Stated that the plan had been successful in that branch of the service in keeping the men in camp and restricting the consumption of liquor.

Colonel Wright expressed a wish for some means of regulating the liquor question in his regiment, but thought the regimental canteen a violation of the law.

General Wood stated that, if authority could be secured from the federal government to sell liquor, a suitable building would be erected at Lake City for a regimental canteen.

Major E. S. Person presented the following paper:

To the Officers and Members of the Minnesota National Guard Association:

I promised your president several days ago that I would have something to say about practice marches and field exercises at this meeting, but since that time, I have been so busy and tied up with my work, that I have not been able to give the subject sufficient thought to prepare the matter as I should have liked to. I have, however, just jotted down a few stray thoughts upon the subject which I take pleasure in presenting to you with the hope that they will bring out many other and more valuable ones. Would practice marches, combined with field exercises, as an occasional substitute for the annual encampment, be conducive to increased interest and efficiency in the national guard? What should be their scope and duration, and what number of troops should the movement include? To the first part of this subject, I should unqualifiedly answer, yes. To my mind, practice marches and field exercises would result in greatly increasing the interest and efficiency of the guard. It would awaken a greater interest among the better class of men in the guard for the men in our ranks who represent the highest types of the soldier would much prefer to come as near to the real work and life of a soldier as possible. To be sure, there is much in our annual course of instruction at camp which is valuable and which should not be eliminated; some things can be taught there which would not be possible in the field. Rifle practice could not be taken up in the field nor could there be quite so many dress parades or reviews, but are there not many things to be learned from field work which are of vastly more importance than to be able to give a fine dress parade or review? And even these can be taken up in the field and done very creditably. You can teach guard duty nearly as well in the field and in some respects much better. There will be less time to devote to day duty and rendering honors, but the actual work of a sentinel in night duty can be better learned on new and unknown ground and under actual field conditions. There will be less time to devote to fancy drills of the company, battalion or regiment, but these can be done at home, and the important thing of learning to handle men under new and constantly changing conditions will be much a more valuable lesson to every officer in the service. If for no other reason than to teach our men how to take care of themselves in the field, I should be in favor of an occasional movement of this character. A soldier must of course know how to shoot, but a soldier must also know how to present himself in the most perfect physical condition or he will soon be out of the game entirely. In camp at Lakeview our men are not taught how to

conserve their strength and properly take care of themselves, and you all know that with the great variety of foot-wear worn the men become footsore and weary after a very short march, drill or parade. I have understood that shoes are to be supplied and this is a move in the right direction, and when we are equipped with the regulation army shoe, field exercises and practice marches will be still more practicable.

The staff departments would be getting a great deal more benefit in the field work than in camp. The Com. of Sub. would have to go against the real thing, and his proposition would be no easy one, but nevertheless, full of valuable experiences. Likewise the quartermaster whose duties in camp are nothing as compared to what they would be in the field. The medical department also would be against a different proposition but would get much more out of it. These are some of the reasons why I say that practice marches and field maneuvers would be conducive to increased interest and efficiency in the national guard. What should be their scope and duration? This depends somewhat upon the next question as to what number of troops should the movement include. Personally, I feel that if the whole brigade could be mobilized at some point where large space could be had for maneuvers, that it would be worth more to the whole guard than to assemble a smaller number of troops. We have had no brigade encampments for years and I believe many valuable lessons could be learned from ten days' work together. The paper work of the army could be worked out in the Adjutant General's department of the brigade and regiments so as to result in much good. If, however, upon investigation it was deemed not advisable to assemble the whole brigade, a single regiment could be used to good advantage, and I think larger bodies. A part of the detachment might be made up of either a part or the whole of the battalion of artillery and should certainly include some of the company of engineers. The trips of the artillery overland to and from camp have given them, I doubt not, a very valuable experience, and from my own experience and that of my regiment in the practice march taken in the northern part of our state in 1901, I can safely state that it was the most enjoyable and profitable ten days that our regiment ever spent together. I believe that 95 per cent of all the officers and men who participated in that march from Milaca to Brainerd will bear me out in that statement, and if I remember rightly we had the largest attendance that year that we ever had. Regarding the scope of instruction, this would, of course, have to be governed somewhat by the country in which you were operating. I think that work which will put to test and develop the ability of the largest number of officers and men is the most valuable work. Battle exercises, offensive and defensive, under different conditions of country, advance and rear guard work, outpost duty, scouting, map sketching, making and forwarding of reports all along the line, selection of camp sites by different officers and the laying out of the same, guard duty, schools of instruction along different lines especially pertaining to the care of the man and the care of the piece in the field, transportation problems, subsistence problems, problems for the medical department and hospital corps; in fact, work to develop all branches and departments of the service along practical and useful lines. You can get more out of the men in the field than in camp and with less work because you always know where they are, and they will be in far better condition with plain wholesome food, regular hours and good hard work. These things come in the field and on the march of necessity and is much better for the men. The fancy dishes, ice creams, pies, cakes and booze which are too numerous at Lakeview, and for that matter, it would be the same near any city, are not only unnecessary but objectionable, as I believe you all will admit. They do not tend to build up the physical manhood and soldierly qualities of our men. The short time which we have to devote to this work of perfecting our organizations in a military way should be spent so that the greatest possible good will result, and in order to obtain these results our whole time and thought should be given to the work and you know this is not possible in camp. There are too many other things constantly bobbing up to take our attention from our work, and I am firmly of the opinion that an occasional movement of the kind contemplated in the subject which I have tried to bring before you would be conducive

to increased interest and efficiency in the national guard. I thank you for your attention and hope that others will have something to say along this same line.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD S. PERSON,
Major Third Infantry, M. N. G.

Captain A. F. Pratt presented the following paper:

Should the troops, in camp or in the field, be subsisted strictly on the army ration, and by whom should the rations be issued?

Would practice marches, combined with field exercises, as an occasional substitute for the annual encampment, be conducive to increased interest and efficiency in the national guard? What should be the scope and duration, and what number of troops should the movement include?

The answer to these questions alike depends upon what answer may properly be given to another question, namely, "What is the national guard for?"

Prior to the passage of the so-called Dick bill, it is difficult to say for just what purpose the national guard was maintained. It was strictly a state organization, owing no duty to the federal government, subject in no way to the authority of the general government, and but little more likely to be mustered into the United States service in time of war, as an organization, than volunteer troops having no previous organization.

The duties of the national guard, up to that time, consisted in assisting to enforce the mandates of the officers of the state, to back up the authority of the local peace officers, and maintain order in cases where the power of the ordinary peace officers was insufficient. The only active service upon which the national guard was likely to be called to enter, was that of so-called "strike" service, or possibly as patrols, in times of great conflagrations, as at Baltimore, or elsewhere.

It followed that the requirements of an efficient national guard, under those circumstances, were far different from what is or may be necessary under the present organization. The services required would necessarily be within the boundaries of our own state, under command of our own officers, subject only to the laws of our own state, and in no way governed by the requirements of the regular army, the army regulations or the articles of war. The kind and quality of the rations issued in time of active service depended only on whether the Adjutant General and the C. O. were good natured or otherwise. In other words, the national guard was a local organization, to all intents and purposes.

It was necessary that the personnel of the different companies and units be such that mobilization could be quickly effected, as in case of strike and riots little notice could usually be given. The discipline was required to be good, as the nature of the services required was such that poor discipline rendered a company or regiment worse than useless. It was not necessary, as a rule, that long marches be prepared for, or that the troops be familiar with camp life to any great extent, or that they be accustomed to the requisition, issuance or handling of rations. The troops were usually quartered in barracks, and rations furnished as to any crew or gang of men.

As at present organized the national guard must be prepared to perform not only any and all the duties formerly required, but also, as I understand it, to become on short notice an integral part of the army of the United States, subject to the army regulations and articles of war, subject to the command of officers familiar with all the rules and regulations of the United States army.

It is therefore plain that if the national guard is ever to be successful in active service, and no one knows when that time may come, attention must be directed to a preparation somewhat different, or better, somewhat advanced, from that formerly required. It is essential that the troops, in some way, be accustomed to the requisition for, the issuance of and the use of, the regular army ration. It takes even a good man some little time to learn how to draw rations for a company. It takes a whole lot of experience to learn how to get the most out of the rations after they are issued, and handle them so that they are wholesome and healthful. Civilian cooks are scarce articles in active service, and it is a mighty good thing if every man in the company can be successfully his own

cook. The point is that if we ever get into active service, the army ration is all that we can get, and we might as well figure on learning how to handle them, one time as another. There is only one way to learn how to use army rations, and that is to use them. All the theory in the country won't help very much, as some of us learned, to our sorrow. When we have a sergeant who can get out his ration requisitions correctly, and then see that his company gets the best cuts of the meat, and a little more than its share of the rest of the grub, and then have some men who know how to cook the ration so that we get all there is in them, we have gone a long way towards learning the duties of a soldier. And when the regimental commissary finds out that he has something to do besides look ornamental, there will be fewer empty stomachs down along the line.

The best place to learn to use army rations is under circumstances as nearly similar to active service as possible, and that is on practice marches. The appetite is better, there is not much chance to get anything else, and the means for cooking and transporting are the same as in service.

As to the issuance of the rations, that depends. It seems to me that located as we are, it would be very convenient, if authorized by law, for rations to be issued to the national guard directly from the post, and paid for by the state, if there is no way to make the United States pay for them, but I presume that all sorts of laws and rules are in the way of that kind of a proposition, so for the present at least rations should be issued by the regimental commissary. The state ought to pay for the rations, and leave the men's pay clear, but I don't suppose it will.

A man can spend a whole lot of time and energy in learning how to roll, sling and carry his blanket without playing him out. He will learn because he has to, that his feet require more care than he ever before dreamed of and that paper-soled shoes are poor stuff for marching. He will learn, because he has to, that there are various ways of pitching a pup tent, so as to be comfortable in wet or cold weather. If he don't learn he finds that he sleeps cold and wet. He will learn that the pitching of a camp in a rough country, where the stumps or rocks are thicker than is the open ground, and where no surveyor has laid out a camp, is something of an art. He will learn that water is sometimes scarce and precious, and will, after a day or two, if not before begin to investigate to find out what his canteen and haversack are for, and whether or not the canteen leaks, and what is the use of a meat ration can, and a few other things.

The quartermaster will find out that he has a job on his hands to provide transportation for a regiment or more; the commissary will learn something, and the whole bunch will know a whole lot more about active service at the end of a good practice march than they did before.

All this could be preached to a company or regiment of the national guard until the company commander and the regimental commander are black in the face, with very little effect; it is the actual experience that does the business. And when a regiment has been through one good stiff practice march, in a rough country, for ten days or so, that regiment is worth something for business.

As to the scope and duration of practice marches there may well be a difference of opinion. My best judgment is that not less than ten successive days should be devoted to a practice march. One or two days' marching has a tendency to tire out and stiffen up the muscles, and it takes from four to five days to get well into the swing of the business, and after that the advantages of the experience begin to be appreciated, the march is thoroughly enjoyed, and opportunity is given to carry out more or less extensive field maneuvers under very favorable circumstances, to the advantage of all concerned.

It would be of great advantage if the camp period could be extended to twenty or thirty days, so that time would be given to be devoted to the different classes of maneuvers each year, but this seems at present to be impossible, so that the best that can be done is to take one camp period from time to time, for practice marches.

It would seem to me that once in five years would be a proper period. Those members of the guard who have participated in one practice march are thereafter fairly well posted along that line, but in five years there is usually a new lot